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Direct Television Broadcasting and
the Quest for Communication
Equality
Howard C. Anawalt*
In the immediate past modem communication means such as efficient
telephone and television systems have been viewed as the luxuries of well
developed economies. Rapid advances in the field of communications and
computer technologies have changed this basic outlook. Now, it is possible
to use these technologies as tools of economic growth in both developed
and developing countries. This is primarily because cost has gone down
while efficiency has gone up. A recent article concerning small computers
demonstrates the point. "If the aircraft industry had developed as spec-
tacularly as the computer industry over the past twenty-five years, a
Boeing 767 would cost $500 today, and it would circle the globe in twenty
minutes on five gallons of fuel." 1
The peoples of the world all wish to benefit from the advantages offered
by these new technologies. The use of communication facilities and com-
puters is bound to change legal institutions within individual nations, and
it seems likely that it will have an impact on international legal relation-
ships as well. In order to gain some understanding of the impact of com-
munications institutions on the formation of international law, I have
chosen to examine the possibility of international regulation of direct
television satellite broadcasting. This form of broadcasting raises questions
of national sovereignty, cultural independence, and free flow of informa-
tion. In addition, examination of the negotiations concerning potential
regulation of this form of broadcasting offers a valuable opportunity for
understanding how the delicate problems of international communication
might be approached and resolved in the future.
* Howard C. Anawalt is Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara; Director of the
University of Santa Clara's Institute on International and Comparative Law; U.S. Member of
the UNESCO consultation on the Right to Communicate held in Bucharest, Romania in 1982.
The author wishes to thank Ms. Kathy Meier for her research and assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article.
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DIRECT TELEVISION BROADCASTING
For years it has been possible to send short wave radio messages from a
transmitter directly to individual radio sets around the world. The reason
for this is that short wave radio clings to the earth's circumference and
allows broadcasting in rough proportion to the power of the transmitter. 2
Television transmissions, on the other hand, travel at a tangent to the
earth's surface and soon escape into the heavens. Thus television program-
ming cannot ordinarily be sent long distances without being rebroadcast
by another station located on the earth's surface. Artificial earth satellites
have changed this capacity, since they have allowed the sending of a
television transmission to a satellite and then back to earth thousands of
miles away. For example, a television broadcast from Europe to North
America can be accomplished by sending the messages by ground trans-
mitter in Europe to a satellite, then back to a second ground station in
North America which rebroadcasts the televised events. Future technolo-
gy, indeed, some existing technology, offers the possibility of eliminating
the need for a second transmitter located in North America. That is, in the
future it may be possible to send a television program from Europe to a
satellite and then from the satellite directly into individual television sets
located in North America or elsewhere in the world. If this ever occurs on
any broad scale, then long range direct telecasting could become as perva-
sive as long distance short wave broadcasting.
RECENT INTERNATIONAL DEBATE
The possibility of long distance direct television broadcasting has sparked
a debate in international legal circles which has lasted a decade and a half.
Television, as we know, is an extremely powerful communications medi-
um. It is a political and economic force. It is political in that it shapes the
expectations of people who watch it. It is even suggested by many com-
munication scholars that such a powerful medium has the capacity to "set
the agenda," or frame the basic politics of the people by identifying the
issues and expectations to which they will pay attention. 3 It is an economic
force which distributes information and which can mobilize the efforts of
the population. Mass media has in the past been very effective at organiz-
ing the efforts of entire populations. One good example is domestic propa-
ganda during time of war, which has been very effective in assisting the
organization of war production.
Such a powerful medium raises issues bearing on the cultural independ-
ence of individual nations, especially those which are less developed
economically. A comment in a working paper prepared by Sweden and
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Canada for one of the early international meetings concerning direct
broadcast satellites summarizes some of these concerns, especially from the
point of view of the developing countries. "It is considered that the proba-
ble impact of direct broadcast systems in a national context could be
particularly profound in developing areas with undeveloped communica-
tion systems where broadcasting from satellites could dramatically change
the entire outlook of millions of people who at the present have little
contact outside their immediate surroundings." 4 Thus, the concerns of the
world community began to emerge in negotiations discussing the use of
these satellites. These concerns were, on the one hand, to preserve the
essence of cultural self-determination or self-guidance, and, on the other,
to assure continued and fertile international communications with all the
benefits that these can bring to mankind.
The debate began in earnest in the late 1960s, but shifted into high gear
when the Soviet Union put forth a proposal in 1972.5 This proposal set the
stage for the formal and informal legal discussions on direct television
broadcasting. The USSR proposed an international convention that would
bind nations to observe, among other items, the following:
1. Prior consent. Transmission from broadcasting states to receiving states
would be illegal, unless the express consent of the receiving state were
obtained.
2. Content regulation. In addition to the content regulation implicit in a
prior restraint regime, the Soviet proposal banned broadcasting of pro-
grams publicizing war, militarism, Nazism and racial hatred; types of con-
tent widely regarded as odious. The proposal also prohibited other broader
categories of content including violence, pornography, use of narcotics and
"broadcasts undermining the foundations of local civilization, culture, way
of life, tradition or language." 6
3. State responsibility. Finally, the proposal provided that the nation or state
"shall bear international responsibility for all national activities connected
with the use of artificial earth satellites for the purposes of direct television
broadcasting, irrespective of whether such broadcasting is carried out by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental organizations. .. ." 7
The USSR enlisted considerable support for this approach. First of all,
the prior consent regime could be seen as a necessary protection of national
sovereignty and national self-development. The specific prohibitions on
content might be viewed as further protection against abusive communica-
tions and assurances of use of a powerful medium for generally peaceful
purposes. Finally, the insistence on state responsibility could be seen as
assuring that the less powerful nations would be able to demand accounta-
bility from those, like the United States, that possess great communica-
tions power. 8
The United States and Certain other western nations opposed the
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USSR's proposal primarily on the basis that it violated a fundamental
international norm or general principle safeguarding the free flow of infor-
mation. These nations frequently cited Article 19 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights which states that "[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any medium and regardless of frontiers." 9 The United
States urged that no special regulation of direct broadcast satellites was
appropriate, and that whatever legal responsibility there might be for such
broadcasts should be resolved by application of existing provisions of
international law. Content regulation in any form was not an appropriate
item for an international covenant. State responsibility for the action of all
communicators would be equally inappropriate, for it would require na-
tional governments to interfere with private broadcasters contrary to ap-
plicable domestic law. 10
Canada and Sweden attempted to create a middle position between
those of the Soviet Union and the United States. Their compromise for-
mula eliminated the prohibition of certain types of content, retained state
responsibility, and offered a prior consent regime under which the sending
and receiving states would be obliged to confer and reach agreement or
arrangements giving due consideration to the facilitation of "the freer and
wider dissemination of information of all kinds."11
It is worthwhile going over some of the elements of the Canadian/
Swedish position as advanced in 1979 in order to appreciate the nature of
the compromise which it offered. First of all, it contained a preamble and
a statement of purposes and objectives which emphasized that direct
television broadcasting should be developed on an orderly and equitable
basis which would promote social and economic development, particularly
in the developing countries. At the same time the preamble recognized that
direct satellite broadcasting presents unique characteristics which are "not
encountered in other forms of broadcasting." 12 Therefore certain legal
principles ought to be recognized which apply solely in that field. This
preamble and statement of purposes appealed to developing nations be-
cause of the emphasis on development and cultural independence. It of-
fered elements of assurance to nations which urge the primacy of the
principle of free flow of information. First of all, since the principles were
restricted to direct television broadcasting, there was less likelihood that
any of the regulatory aspects would carry over to other forms of communi-
cation. Secondly, the preamble emphasized international cooperation, and
the text of the declaration of principles specifically highlighted elements
of the doctrine of free flow.
The purposes and objectives section of the 1979 working paper stressed
that direct television broadcasting activities should be compatible with
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"development of mutual understanding and the strengthening of friendly
relations and cooperation among all states ... ," 13 This aspect of the draft
addressed a basic Soviet concern, namely, that international broadcasting
should not be used to foment war or other disruptions of peace. The draft
also provided that each nation or state "should bear international responsi-
bility" for television broadcasting whether carried out by state entities or
private broadcasters under their jurisdiction. 14 This also appealed to the
Soviet Union, which had long urged that states must bear responsibility
for broadcasting. The Soviet position on this point appears to have been
based on the notion that state responsibility is necessary in order to pre-
serve the sovereign prerogatives of receiving nations. State responsibility
was probably important to developing nations not so much because of its
protection of sovereignty per se, but because it would help preserve the
cultural independence of these nations. Is For reasons which will be ex-
plained later in this paper, the position on state responsibility can be
viewed as acceptable to the United States and other western jurisprudence
as well.
Finally, it should be noted that the 1979 working draft strongly support-
ed the principle of free flow of information at a most important juncture.
The most difficult item to resolve in the years of negotiation was the
problem of prior consent or agreement on the part of the receiving state.
The 1979 draft retained a prior consent requirement in that the broadcast-
ing state was required to consult and obtain agreement on the part of the
recipient state, but both parties were obliged to bear in mind an overriding
purpose of the agreement, namely that it was to be entered into "in order
to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds
and to encourage cooperation in the field of information and the exchange
of information with other countries." 16 Good faith bargaining in the name
of freedom of information was required for all parties.
The Swedish/Canadian proposal of 1979 was a useful and concrete
proposal. Its key feature was that it articulated principles to guide the
conduct of nations rather than establish rules which might appear inflexi-
ble in the growing area of communications. The principles referred to
existing international law, especially the Outer Space Treaty, and created
specific boundaries for bargaining in good faith concerning reception of
television broadcasting. The proposal offered a basis for meeting the con-
cerns of cultural independence and of advancing the principle of free flow.
It urged protection of the dignity of individual national cultures and creat-
ed a growing basis for a right to receive information, including by way of
satellite broadcast.
366 REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
THE 1982 RESOLUTION
The debate on direct television broadcast regulation appears to have come
to a close in the fall of 1982, when a resolution concerning direct television
broadcasting was adopted by the General Assembly. 17 By that time the
problem areas in the agenda appeared to have been refined to four items
concerning the merits of the proposed satellite broadcasting principles, and
a fifth problem, which was the desire to achieve consensus. As a general
rule, the nations attempt to achieve consensus or general agreement on
major issues of substance. The reason for this is that international support,
hence progress, may not be forthcoming where there are substantial dis-
senting views. As we will see, consensus was not achieved with respect to
the direct broadcast principles. The five items of importance were:
1. "Shall" versus "should. " First of all, there was the issue of whether the
direct broadcast resolution should be couched in mandatory or precatory
terms, whether it should mandate or recommend certain practices. It ap-
pears to have been this issue more than any other that split the internation-
al community in the final vote. 18 A substantial majority of the nations
voting in the General Assembly, including the majority of the developing
countries, voted for a resolution cast in mandatory language which pro-
vided that direct satellite broadcasting service "shall only be established
after" consultations have occurred between the sending and receiving
states and after agreements and/or arrangements have been established. 19
2. Prior consent. The language of the resolution calls for a prior consent
regime concerning direct broadcasting. While theresolution of the General
Assembly is not legally binding, some of the dissenting and abstaining
nations appeared dissatisfied that such a regime should be recommended,
especially in absence of consensus and without the encouragement to free
flow of information which was built into the 1979 Canadian/Swedish
proposal. This appeared for example in the remarks made by Mr. Bratt-
strom of Sweden to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 20
He indicated that Sweden had abstained in the committee vote on the
resolution because the proposed principles did not contain a preamble
containing a number of important considerations which might militate
against an interpretation that governments should be permitted to control
the content of programs. Previous versions of the resolution had for the
most part contained such preambulatory language to guide interpretation.
One of the most recent examples was a final Swedish working paper
submitted, apparently some time in 1982, which emphasized promotion of
the right of freedom of expression and the importance of free flow and
mutual exchange of information. 21
3. State responsibility. A third outstanding issue was the question of state
responsibility. In this case the resolution adopted by the General Assembly
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included language which was precatory rather than mandatory: "States
should bear responsibility for international direct television broadcasting
by satellite carried out by them or under their jurisdiction and for the
conformity of any such activities with the principles set forth in this
document." 22 However, the dissenting nations and some of the abstaining
nations must undoubtedly have understood that this portion of the resolu-
tion was antagonistic to free flow of information, especially when coupled
with a prior consent rule. The Swedish representative to the committee
stated, "[Tihe formulation of the principle of state responsibility was too
broad and could be interpreted as implying a responsibility on the part of
Governments for the content of programmes." 23 Thus, it appears that
Sweden and, indeed Canada, both of whom abstained in the committee
vote and in the General Assembly vote, had abandoned their project of
endorsing a principle of state responsibility where there was no adequate
emphasis on free flow of information as a basic guiding principle.
4. The role of international law. The United States, as has been noted, was
reluctant to have any general statement of principles concerning direct
broadcast satellites, since that country viewed general international law to
be sufficient. 24 However, the statements of the American representative,
Mr. Lichenstein, indicated that the United States government had been
persuaded to go along with some kind of a draft resolution, so long as the
draft resolution relied primarily on existing international regulation of the
radio spectrum. Mr. Lichenstein indicated that consensus had in fact been
rejected by a majority in the Outer Space Committee. He stated:
Those rejecting consensus were apparently unwilling to deal with two sensi-
tive issues, namely international legal responsibility of states regarding the
content of broadcasting and the requirement of prior consent, through a
nonprejudiced reference to the international law on those matters. The adop-
tion of a text going beyond that would only highlight the fact that interna-
tional law did not provide for the kind of State responsibility or require the
kind of nontechnical, non-ITU-oriented prior agreements or arrangements
which the draft resolution called for. 25
On this issue, it appears that the United States was unable to persuade
many other nations to go along with it. Some form of United Nations
recommendations concerning direct broadcast satellites would certainly
have been supported by most of the dissenting nations in the final United
Nations vote, provided some consensus could have been reached on appro-
priate emphasis to be given to the importance of free flow of information.
One can only speculate on whether the United States would in fact have
joined such a consensus.
5. Consensus. Finally, there was the issue of consensus. These negotiations
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concerning direct broadcast satellite regulations had gone on for more than
a decade. A study of the mass of documents created by the Outer Space
Committee and its legal subcommittee testifies to the hard work of the
various delegations and to the continuous efforts to achieve some sort of
meaningful compromise. No doubt all the nations participating made
genuine efforts to arrive at a compromise or consensus. This includes both
the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union abandoned its
insistence on outlawing certain program content. The United States appar-
ently indicated some willingness to concur in some sort of recommenda-
tion for prior consultation including prior arrangements or agreements. 
26
Numerous members of the Outer Space Committee spoke of the need for
achieving consensus on this delicately debated issue. Nations on the record
lamenting the absence of consensus included the United States, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, New Zealand, The
Netherlands, Austria, France, Turkey, Italy, Canada, Ireland, and Sweden.
The general tenor of these observations was that without the achievement
of consensus there might be no meaningful international legal resolution
of the issues which had been debated for so long. Even though consensus
was lacking in the final outcome it is likely that the negotiations will have
made a significant mark on world communications development.
THE IMPACT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
The impact of the direct broadcast negotiations will be felt for years. While
non-binding legally, the resolution does crystalize current world views on
direct broadcasting. It also presents a preview of issues which will arise in
other sensitive areas of communication and computer technology, such as
control of technical data flow and access to powerful computer data banks
and software. In an epoch that thrives on information, when knowledge
is literally power, the issues of sovereignty, cultural identity and free flow
of ideas will dominate the international scene.
While the different nations and different national blocks have decidedly
different self-interests, it is nevertheless possible to assess the success of
the negotiations from a general perspective. The world depends on com-
munications, and since the Treaty of Paris established the International
Telegraph Union in 1865,27 the community of nations has recognized that
the communications order is dependent on cooperation. From the point of
view of achieving further cooperation, the direct broadcast rounds
achieved passing marks, but certain inadequacies stand out in sharp relief.
For one thing, claims of sovereignty were confused with claims of
cultural independence. For example, in March, 1982 the Bulgarian delegate
to the Outer Space Committee stated that the draft principles concerning
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direct broadcasting "should be subordinated to the general recognition of
the principle of state sovereignty and strict respect for sovereign States and
non-interference in their internal affairs." 28 The difficulty with this type
of statement is that such concerns for preservation of sovereignty are not
germane in a communications debate. A state's sovereignty signifies its
power over its own territory and acknowledged authority to govern its
inhabitants. 29 Communication, however, does not threaten territorial in-
tegrity or undermine legal authority over inhabitants. International com-
munications simply present information and ideas. A government's
authority cannot be undermined by ideas alone. If a government finds
itself overwhelmed by communication, it must already be enfeebled by
other causes so that its sovereignty is in jeopardy. 30
Cultural independence, on the other hand, may be endangered by pow-
erful communications media. The pace of change which is suggested and
even facilitated by television programs may begin to sweep aside existing
mores and patterns of life. 31 The national personality or culture might be
gobbled up in the process. Protection of national cultures is an implicit goal
of the United Nations system. The Charter is based on the principle of
sovereign equality of nations, and the concept of self-determination seems
to embrace a concern for preservation of the elements of the separate
cultural, linguistic and philosophical groups that make up the world com-
munity. 32 In 1946 Professor Philip Jessup observed that nations have
"feelings"; these feelings should be taken into account if one seeks a more
just world order. 33 These feelings are no doubt the very thing that drives
the developing nations to claim a stronger position in the world communi-
cations system. Each nation wants to find and use its own voice. The
MacBride Commission probably expressed a deeply held consensus when
it stated, "every country should develop its communication patterns in
accordance with its own conditions, needs and traditions, thus strengthen-
ing its integrity, independence and self reliance."3 4 Such cultural in-
dependence can be aided by explicit international arrangements. However,
future negotiations in search of such arrangements must emphasize the
appropriate concern which is cultural independence, not the preservation
of state sovereignty, as the latter is not generally in issue.
The utility of the doctrine of "free flow" of information should likewise
be scrutinized. I am convinced that a minimum-censorship principle is
essential in international communications legal theory and practice. Offi-
cial interference with the content of communications should be restricted
to that which is truly necessary to the public order, and such restrictions
should be spelled out in the law. 35 The utility of this principle is based on
two conditions, both of which are within the practical control of the
world's sovereigns. First of all, realization of the promise of free flow of
information depends, as a practical matter, on acceptance by national
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governments. 36 Secondly, national governments remain free to articulate
specific institutions for enhancing the flow of uncensored communications.
In particular, nations are free to go beyond the international minimum in
creating even greater communication freedom.
Advocates of free flow and minimum censorship should be careful to
distinguish real threats to these principles from lesser problems and an-
noyances. For example, the content restrictions originally put forward by
the Soviet Union would have squelched a whole range of international
programming and would have stood as an endorsement for broad censor-
ship on regional and domestic levels as well. 37 Such an approach must be
strongly resisted and, at a minimum, scaled down.
A similar problem exists with respect to the prior consent requirement.
However, prior consent requirements will have less censorial effect when
coupled with obligations to observe other elements of international law.
For example, the receiving state can be obliged to allow entry of program-
ming, unless it has specific and necessary legislation which controls such
content in accordance with the terms of Article 19.
The provision for state responsibility is not, however, a grave stumbling
block to free flow. First of all, it should be recognized that any such
requirement stands basically as a means of identifying an internationally
recognizable accountable party. It is rather like identifying those who are
possible defendants in a certain class of lawsuit. The principle does not
dictate the outcome in a given situation, but identifies the state as responsi-
ble under the terms of international law. 3s Even when such responsibility
is enforced against a state for an offending broadcast by a private broad-
caster under its jurisdiction, there need be no censorship of the broadcast-
er.
For example, suppose CBS broadcasts to Saudi Arabia without making
a prior arrangement. The remedies available to Saudi Arabia include diplo-
matic protest to the United States government and bringing legal action in
United States courts against CBS. If a protest is lodged, the United States
government can comply in full good faith with the principle of state
responsibility by acknowledging the breach of principle and requesting
CBS to participate in consultations to be held with Saudi Arabia. In the
event of serious or continuous direct broadcasts, the United States could
even pay some damages, without demanding indemnity from the broad-
caster. If violation of the direct broadcast principles were made a statutory
basis of a legal action in the United States courts, CBS could raise all
appropriate international and national legal defenses to the Saudi suit,
including free flow obligations and the First Amendment. 3 9
I conclude that the negotiations would have achieved a greater interna-
tional commitment to improved broadcasting if the confusion of sover-
eignty and cultural independence had been eliminated, and the free flow
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TOWARD REGULATION 371
advocates had acknowledged that free flow in broadcasting will survive
certain requirements such as consent and state responsibility. 40 The con-
clusion of the direct broadcasting negotiations is disappointing from an
international perspective because so many developed nations with strong
communications capacity dissented or abstained. 41 The resolution so far
does not enjoy the wholehearted support of the powerful communicators,
and as Judge Jessup has emphasized, it is critical under the United Nations
system that the powerful nations be persuaded to use their resources for
"the general advantage of the international community" if there is to be
progress toward economic fairness on a world scope. 42
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to assume that genuine interna-
tional cooperation will evolve under the direct broadcasting resolution as
adopted. 43 The resolution does recognize the principle that everyone has
the right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas." Although
its text confounds sovereignty and cultural independence, it does empha-
size that free dissemination of ideas is important "particularly in the devel-
oping countries." The critical provisions concerning the requirement of
agreement to reception by the receiving state are arguably conditioned by
the requirement that the receiving state must give due accord to interna-
tional principles concerning free flow when making its decision. 44
On the practical level one can envision actual consultations between a
broadcaster like BBC or ABC and a potential receiving state once direct
broadcasting facilities become practical. The consultations to arrange for
broadcasting to a recipient state, for example Kenya, would have to be
between Kenya and the United States or the United Kingdom. However,
as a practical matter, the broadcast entities would certainly play the largest
role. The recipient state would most likely be very careful before exercising
any option of excluding all broadcasts, as the chances are that this would
disadvantage the people and national development. 4 During any consul-
tations, the broadcaster would emphasize the benefits of its services, and
the recipient would express its needs. In fact, the utility of direct broad-
casting might be so great that the recipient state might be the initiating
party urging a direct broadcast entity to include it within the sweep of its
broadcast. Once direct broadcasting arrangements have been established,
the broadcaster should be free to operate generally without specific pro-
gram censorship, unless specific provisions for program supervision have
been built into the agreement. 46 Presumably the broadcaster will have
many valuable bargaining chips to use to persuade the recipient to shy
away from heavy censorial arrangements. 47
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CONCLUSION
Progress in the field of communication should be measured by enhanced
ability of individuals and groups to communicate and understand. One
part of this facility to communicate is the acquisition of ideas, and another
is the ability to speak with one's own voice. The concept of free flow
appears to embrace both of these, yet practically it favors those nations
which have the greater communications power. Thus, the direct broadcast-
ing negotiations took place among nations which accorded different priori-
ties to enhancing the flow of information on the one hand, and
preservation of the national "voice" on the other.
On balance, the negotiations and the resulting United Nations resolu-
tion should be judged as solid achievements. During the negotiations the
relative importance of values was earnestly debated and compromises
were, in fact, achieved, Unfortunately, consensus eluded the parties-
unfortunate because international communication depends so fully on
internation cooperation. The negotiations were also marred by confusion
of sovereignty claims with cultural identity concerns. However, in the end,
a suggested mode of cooperation was set forth within which broadcasters
and receiving states can work successfully.
The present state and rate of telecommunications development make it
likely that international direct television broadcasting will become a real-
ity. 48 Thus, the United Nations resolution will turn out to be of practical
importance, unless it is ignored. It would be impolitic for the powerful
broadcasting states to ignore such a resolution, and I hope that this article
has demonstrated that there is no necessity or utility in their doing so. 49
Governments in power will always be tempted to employ censorship, and
their efforts in that direction must be met with all the firmness that can
be mustered. In the case of international communications, the tendency to
censor can best be met by recognition of needs of all peoples to express
and to continue to develop their own national ideas. 50
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